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Abstract
Approval ballot based committee formation is con-
cerned with aggregating individual approvals of
voters. Voters submit their approvals of candidates
and these approvals are aggregated to arrive at the
optimal committee of specified size. There are sev-
eral aggregation techniques proposed in the litera-
ture and these techniques differ among themselves
on the criterion function they optimize. Voters pref-
erences for a candidate is based on his/her opinion
on candidate suitability. We note that candidates
have attributes that make him/her suitable or oth-
erwise. Hence, it is relevant to approve attributes
and select candidates who have the approved at-
tributes. This paper addresses the committee se-
lection problem when voters submit their approvals
on attributes. Though attribute based preference is
addressed in several contexts, committee selection
problem with attribute approval has not been at-
tempted earlier. We note that extending the theory
of candidate approval to attribute approval in com-
mittee selection problem is not trivial. In this pa-
per, we study different aspects of this problem and
show that none of the existing aggregation rules sat-
isfies Unanimity and Justified Representation when
attribute based approvals are considered. We pro-
pose a new aggregation rule that satisfies both the
above properties. We also present other analysis
of committee selection problem with attribute ap-
proval.
1 Introduction
Committee selection by aggregating voters’ preferences is a
fundamental problem of Social Choice Theory and has re-
cently received considerable attention of AI community [2;
3; 22; 23]. Preference by approval ballots and preference by
ranking are two important ways of expressing voters’ prefer-
ences. Approval ballot based method for committee selection
is concerned with aggregating individual approvals of vot-
ers for selection of candidates. There are several aggregation
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techniques proposed in the literature and these techniques dif-
fer among themselves on the criterion function they optimize
for candidate selection. Approval Voting maximizes approval
counts; Satisfaction Approval Voting maximizes voters’ sat-
isfaction and similarly, voter’s utility is optimized in Pro-
portional Approval Voting. Minimax Approval Voting and
Reweighted Approval Voting maximize different criteria and
we elaborate these in the text. All these techniques assume
that the voters approve individual candidates and these ap-
provals are used to select a set of candidates to form a com-
mittee.
A voter prefers a candidate because of candidate’s suitabil-
ity for the objective in hand. Candidates possess attributes
that make a candidate suitable or otherwise. Instead of voters
approving individual candidates, it is pertinent that voters ex-
press their preferences for attributes or characteristics of can-
didates. For instance, in order to form a cricket team, it is bet-
ter to solicit approval on the attributes of player such as Run
Tally Impact, Partnership-Building Impact, Pressure Impact,
New Ball Impact etc., instead of seeking approval of indi-
vidual players. Expressing preferences directly on attributes
will lead to effective committee selection. Moreover, bribery,
manipulability and bias can be controlled with attribute level
preferences. The Constraint Approval Voting Systems [5;
17] utilizes candidates’ attributes for committee formation.
They describe a candidate as a vector of attributes and se-
lect a committee W in such a way that some of the de-
sired constraints over attributes is to be satisfied. For in-
stance, Brams et al. [5] represent a candidate with two at-
tributes, ‘Region of the candidate’ and ‘Specialty’ and the
constraint could be 10% of candidates in the committee
should be from region A. However, the concept is com-
pletely different from our proposal in the sense that we deal
with committee formation based on attribute approval. We
also study different properties related to standard aggrega-
tion rules. Study of attribute-level preferences exists in var-
ious applications such as Food [19; 13; 4], Health Care [21;
1], Housing [10], Farming [16], Airline Services [11], Tech-
nology Product Markets [24], Job [12], E- transactions [9],
Travel [14]. In this case, voters’ approval on attributes are
required to be aggregated to determine a set of candidates for
a committee. There has not been any attempt in this direc-
tion in the context of committee formation based on approval
ballots.
In this paper, we address the problem of committee selec-
tion wherein voters approve different attribute values. A can-
didate is represented by d attribute values which are drawn
from a specified domain. Voters submit their ballots for each
of d attributes. The objective is to select a committeeW of k
candidates given approval ballots of the voters. As mentioned
earlier, though the problem is important in the context of com-
mittee selection, there has not been any study taken place in
this direction. Extending the results of candidate-approval
based committee selection to attribute-approval based method
is not trivial. In this paper, we formally present the formu-
lation of the problem and several analytical results of com-
mittee selection with approvals on attributes. We analyze
standard aggregation rules and their properties. We show
that two properties, namely Unanimity and Justified Repre-
sentation are not satisfied by standard aggregation techniques
while taking into consideration attribute based approvals. We
propose here a new aggregation rule and show that this rule
satisfies Unanimity as well as Justified Representation. In this
process, we give a detailed analysis of Unanimity and Justi-
fied Representation.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next
section, we formulate and analyze the committee selection
problem with attribute level approval. The detail analysis on
Unanimity and Justified Representation are presented in Sec-
tion 3 and Section 4, respectively. We propose a new rule
called Greedy Approval Voting (GAV) in Section 5. Section
6 provides conclusion and scope for future work.
2 Aggregation Rules
Let V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} be the set of voters and C =
{c1, c2, . . . , cm} be the set of candidates. Each candidate
ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, is a d-dimensional attribute vector. The
attribute value ci[j] of candidate ci on dimension j is from
domain Dj , 1 ≤ j ≤ d. Let Cji be the set of elements in
Dj approved by vi. We use a notation Va to denote set of
voters who have approved an attribute-value a. The goal is
to select a committee W of size k given voters’ approvals
over attributes i.e., Cji , ∀vi ∈ V, j ∈ [1, d]. Table 1 summa-
rizes the notations used in this paper. There are different ag-
gregating rules known in the context of approval voting with
candidate-approval. We study below these rules in the context
of attribute-approval committee selection.
Approval Voting (AV) − Approval Voting selects a com-
mittee W that maximizes
∑
vi∈V
|W ∩ Ci|, where Ci is the
set of candidates approved by a voter vi [6]. When vot-
ers submit their approval on attributes, the approval vot-
ing score of c with respect to V is defined as AV (c, V ) =
∑
vi∈V
∑
d
j=1
|{vi|c[j]∈C
j
i
}|
d . The approval voting score of a
committee W is AV (W,V ) =
∑
c∈W AV (c, V ). Hence,
Approval Voting (AV) rule selectsW with highestAV (W,V )
which can be computed by maximizing
∑
vi∈V
∑d
j=1|W
j ∩
Cji |, where W
j is the set of attributes on dimension j of
W . Approval Voting rule can be computed in polynomial
time to form a committee. Computing approval score for
each attribute involves scanning n ballots and can be done in
Table 1: Summary of notations
Notation Description
V Set of voters
C Set of candidates
ci[j] Attribute value of a candidate ci on dimension j
Va Set of voters who approved an attrubute value a
Dj Set of domain values on domin j
Cji Set of attributes approved by a voter vi on domension j
c∗ candidate with highest utility score
W Target committee
VW Set of voters who approved at least one candidate inW
k Target committee size
n Number of voters
m Number of candidates
d Number of dimentions
O(nan), where na number of distinct attributes values. Ap-
proval score of a candidate can be computed in O(md) and
identifying top-k candidates takes O(klog(m)). Hence, AV
for attribute-approval is of O(nan).
Satisfaction Approval Voting (SAV) − SAV [7] se-
lects a committee W that maximizes voters satisfaction
score
∑
vi∈V
|W∩Ci|
|Ci|
. In the case of attribute-approval
voting, we define satisfaction score of vi for W as
SAV (W, vi) =
AV (W,vi)
min(AV (C,vi),kd)
=
∑d
j=1
|W j∩Cj
i
|
min(
∑
d
j=1
|Cj∩Cj
i
|,kd)
,
where W j (resp.Cj) is the set of attributes of
W (C, respectively) on dimension j. SAV selects the
W that maximizes
∑
vi∈V
SAV (W, vi). The complexity of
SAV is the same as that of AV.
Reweighted Approval Voting (RAV) − At every stage,
RAV reweighs voter’s approval score of a candidate and then
selects the candidate with highest approval score [7]. We de-
fine reweighed scoreRAV (c, vi) as r(vi)×
∑
d
j=1|vi|c[j]∈C
j
i
|
d ,
where r(vi) =
1
1+AV (W,vi)
. We start with W = ∅
and at every stage we select a candidate c that maximizes∑
vi∈V
RAV (c, vi) till |W | = k. RAV is a multi-stage AV,
hence, score computation needs to be done k times. Hence,
the overall computation required in RAV is O(nank).
Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) − PAV was proposed
by Forest Simmons in 2001 [15] and is known to be NP-
hard [3]. The objective of PAV is to maximize the sum of vot-
ers’ utilities, where utility of voter vi is 1+
1
2 + . . .+
1
|W∩Ci|
.
With attribute-approval, PAV selects W ⊆ C of size k that
maximizes
∑
vi∈V
u(AV (W, vi)), where u(p) = 1 +
1
2 +
. . .+ 1⌊p⌋ +
1
⌈p⌉ (⌈p⌉ − p).
Minimax Approval Voting (MAV)− MAV [8] selects a
committee W that minimizes the maximum Hamming dis-
tance between W and voters’ approval ballots. Given
attribute approvals, we define MAV-score of a commit-
tee W as MAX(f(W, v1), f(W, v2), . . . , f(W, vn)), where
f(W, vi) = MAX(d(W
j , Cji )
d
j=1) and d(A
j , Bj) =
|Aj\Bj |+|Bj\Aj |
|Dj| . MAV returns a committeeW with the low-
est MAV-score. MAV is also known to be NP-hard prob-
lem [18].
Table 2: Summary of the properties satisfied by rules
AV SAV PAV RAV MAV
Homogeneity X X X X X
Consistency X X X X X
Monotonicity X X X X X
Committee Monotonicity X X × X ×
2.1 Properties
In this section, we review some standard properties that are
desired to be satisfied by multi-winner approval based rules.
We omit all the trivial proofs. Table 2 summarizes different
properties satisfied by different rules.
Homogeneity − A rule is said to satisfy Homogeneity prop-
erty if it selects the same W independent of number of times
voters’ ballot is replicated.
Consistency − A rule is said to satisfy consistency if it con-
structs the same committee W for voters lists V and V ′, it
also generatesW with respect to the voters list V ∪ V ′.
Monotonicity− A rule is monotonic if it satisfies the follow-
ing two conditions, 1) If c ∈W with respect to V then c ∈W
with respect to Vc[j] ← Vc[j] ∪ Vx, Vx * Vc[j], j ∈ [1, d] 2)
If c /∈ W with respect to V then c /∈ W with respect to
Vc[j] ← Vc[j] \ Vx, Vx ⊆ Vc[j], j ∈ [1, d].
Committee Monotonicity− SupposeW andW ′ are the com-
mittees selected by rule R with |W | = k and |W ′| = k + 1.
The rule R is committee monotonic if W ⊂ W ′.
Besides the above properties,Unanimity and Justified Rep-
resentation are very important properties that are desired to
be satisfied by approval voting based rules. We study these
two properties in subsequent sections.
3 Unanimity
Unanimity is agreement by all voters in the context of com-
mittee selection. If there exists a set of candidates who are
unanimously approved by all voters then at least one of them
should be present in the selected committee W . A rule is
unanimous if, when ∩vi∈V Ci 6= ∅, it selects a committee W
such that ∩vi∈V Ci ∩ W 6= ∅ [2]. Using the same princi-
ple, we define unanimity for attribute level preferences in two
ways 1) Weak Unanimity − If ∃j ∈ [1, d] with ∩
vi∈V
Cji 6= ∅
then ∃j′ ∈ [1, d] with ∩
vi∈V
Cj
′
i ∩W
j′ 6= ∅, where W j is set
of attributes of W on dimension j. 2) Strong Unanimity −
∀j ∈ [1, d] with ∩
vi∈V
Cji 6= ∅ it holds ∩
vi∈V
Cji ∩W
j 6= ∅.
Lemma 1. There may not exist a committee that provides
strong unanimity for k < d.
Proof. Consider two candidates c1 = [a1, b1] and c2 =
[a2, b2], and k = 1. The approvals for each of these attributes
are given as Va1 = Vb2 = V and Va2 = Vb1 = {v1}. Se-
lecting any one of these two candidates violates the strong
unanimity property. One can assure a committeeW that pro-
vides strong unanimity when k ≥ d.
It is to be noted that for d = 1 both weak and strong una-
nimity convey the same meaning. Other possible variant of
unanimity is, if there exists multiple unanimous candidates,
then all of them should be present in the committee W . We
limit our study to the standard unanimity as defined at the
starting of this section.
Lemma 2. Given voters’ attribute-approval, Approval Voting
and Satisfaction Approval Voting do not satisfy weak unanim-
ity for k ≥ 1 and d > 1. Approval Voting and Satisfaction
Approval Voting satisfies unanimity for d = 1.
Proof. LetX1 = {v1, v2, . . . , vn/2}, X
2 = V \ {vn} and let
Vc1[1] = V, (Vc1[j] = X
1)dj=2, ((Vci[j] = X
2)mi=2)
d
j=1. AV or
SAV selects a set W ⊆ C \ {c1}, whereas c1[1] is the only
attribute which is unanimously approved by all voters and is
not part ofW . Hence, AV and SAV do not satisfy unanimity.
For d = 1, if there exists an attribute which is unanimously
approved by all voters then the corresponding candidate se-
cures highest approval score and satisfaction approval score.
Hence, AV and SAV satisfy unanimity for d = 1.
Lemma 3. In the context of attribute approval voting,
Reweighted Approval Voting and Proportional Approval Vot-
ing do not satisfy weak unanimity for k ≥ 1 and d > 1.
Reweighted Approval Voting and Proportional Approval Vot-
ing satisfy unanimity for d = 1.
Proof. Let X1 = {v1, v2, . . . , vn/2}, X
2 = V \ {vn} and
X3 = V \ {v1}. Vc1[1] = V, (Vc1[j] = X
1)dj=1, ((Vci[j] =
X2)
⌈m/2⌉
i=2 )
d
j=1 and ((Vci[j] = X
3)mi=⌈m/2⌉+1)
d
j=1. RAV or
PAV selects a set W ⊆ C \ {c1}, whereas c1[1] is the only
attribute which is unanimously approved by all voters and is
not part of W . Hence, RAV and PAV do not satisfy unanim-
ity for d > 1. When d = 1: Suppose W be the committee
selected according to RAV (or, PAV) and has unanimous can-
didate (attribute) c. Replacing any candidate c′ ∈ C \ W
with c would not increase RAV-score (or, PAV-score) of W .
Hence, RAV and PAV satisfy unanimity for d = 1.
Lemma 4. For attribute-approval voting, Minimax Approval
Voting does not satisfy weak unanimity for k ≥ 1 and d > 1
and Minimax Approval Voting satisfies unanimity for d = 1.
Proof. We omit the generalized proof due to its complexity.
Let C = {c1, c2, c3}, c1 = [a11, a12, a13, a14], c2 = [a21, a22
, a23, a24], c3 = [a31, a32, a33, a34]. Consider 4 kinds
of voters’ ballots(voters’ ballots for each attribute is
separated by comma) i.e., {a11a21a31, a12, a13, a14},
{a11a21a31, a12, a13a23a33, a14a24a34}, {a11a21a31, a22a32
, a23a33, a24a34} and {a11, a22a32, a23a33, a24a34}. Let
k = 1, MAV score of c1 is 1, c2 and c3 is 2/3. MAV selects
a W that minimizes MAV score, hence, it selects c2 or c3
whereas a11 is the only attribute approved by all voters and
is neither part of c2 nor c3. Similarly, it is easy to show that
for k > 1, MAV does not satisfy unanimity. When d = 1, if
there exists an attribute which is approved by all voters then
it has smaller MAV score than that of any other attribute.
Thus MAV selects attribute which is unanimously approved
by all voters.
Proposition 1. If a rule does not satisfy weak unanimity then
it does not satisfy strong unanimity as well.
From the Lemmas (2-4) and the Proposition 1, it can be
seen that none of the extended rules satisfy unanimity (both
weak and strong). We propose a simple greedy based rule in
Section 5, namely Greedy Approval Voting (GAV), that satis-
fies unanimity property.
4 Justified Representation
Justified representation is a crucial property that is desired
to be satisfied by approval based rules. Justified Representa-
tion [2], Extended Justified Representation [2], Proportional
Justified Representation [?], Proportional Representation [20]
and Strong Proportional Representation [20] are based on
similar concepts. If there exists a sizeable group of voters
with common preferences then the group should have repre-
sentation in the committee. The minimum number of repre-
sentatives to be selected from the group is based on the size
of the group and the number of common approvals. Keeping
this objective, we define justified representation for attribute-
approval voting in two ways, 1) Simple Justified Representa-
tion (SJR) and 2) Compound Justified Representation (CJR).
For d = 1 simple and compound justified representations are
the same.
Definition 1. W provides simple justified representation if
there does not exist a set of voters V ′ ⊆ V such that (|V ′| ≥
n
k )∧( ∩vi∈V ′
Cji 6= ∅)∧(| ∪
vi∈V ′
Cj
′
i ∩W
j′ | = ∅), 1 ≤ j, j′ ≤ d.
For k = 1, any random candidate also satisfies simple jus-
tified representation unless there exists a candidate who has
no approval on any attribute.
Lemma 5. Approval Voting does not satisfy simple justified
representation for k ≥ 2.
Proof. Let C = {c1, c2, . . . , ck+2} be the set of candi-
dates. Let X1 = {vi, i ∈ [1,
n(k−1)
k ]}, X
2 = {vi, i ∈
[n(k−1)k +1, n]} andX
3 = {vn}. Consider profiles ((Vci[j] =
X1)ki=1)
d
j=1. (Vck+1[j] = {X
2})
d
2
j=1 and (Vck+1[j] =
X3)dd
2
+1
. (Vck+2[j] = X
3)
d
2
j=1 and (Vck+2[j] = {X
2})d
j= d
2
+1
.
ck+1 or ck+2 is required to be present in W in order to
satisfy simple justified representation whereas AV selects
{c1, . . . , ck}.
Lemma 6. Proportional Approval Voting and Reweighted
Approval Voting do not satisfy simple justified representation
for k ≥ 3 and d ≥ 2 or d ≥ 3 and k ≥ 2. For k ≤ 2
and d ≤ 2, Proportional Approval Voting and Satisfaction
Approval Voting satisfy simple justified representation.
Proof. Let us consider that C = {c1, c2, . . . , c5},
n = 90. Consider the following approvals ballots
over attributes, (Vc1[j] = {v1, v2, . . . , v35})
d
j=1, (Vc2[j] =
{v21, . . . , v55})dj=1, (Vc3[j] = {v26, . . . , v60})
d
j=1, (Vc4[j] =
{v1, v2})
d
2
j=1, (Vc4[j] = {v61, . . . , v90})
d
j= d
2
+1
, (Vc5[j] =
{v61, . . . , v90})
d
2
j=1, (Vc5[j] = {v1, v2})
d
j= d
2
+1
. Let us as-
sume k = 3 and d = 2. PAV (or, RAV) selects {c1, c2, c3}
and ignores set of nk ({v61, . . . , v90}) voters who jointly ap-
proved c4[2] and c5[1]. Hence, PAV and RAV do not satisfy
simple justified representation. To extend the proof to k > 3,
we take k − 3 additional candidates and (k − 3) × 30 addi-
tional voters, and assign 30 unique votes to each new candi-
date (same set of voters for all the attributes of a candidate).
In this case also PAV(or, RAV) ignores c4 and c5, hence, ig-
nores a set of n/k voters who jointly approved for some at-
tribute. For k = 2 and d ≥ 3, the same generalization given
in the above example works. Hence, PAV and SAV do not
satisfy simple justified representation for k ≥ 3 and d ≥ 2 or
d ≥ 3 and k ≥ 2.
For k = 2 and d = 2, RAV and PAV satisfy simple justified
representation. In the case of RAV, after selecting the first
candidate with the highest AV score, the candidate having n2
approvals for one of its attributes will have the highest score
irrespective of number of approvals for the second attribute.
Hence, no n/2 voters are completely unrepresented if they
jointly approve some attribute. Similar logic works for PAV.
Hence, RAV and PAV satisfy simple justified representation
for k = 2 and d = 2. When d = 1, the analysis is same as
given in [2].
Lemma 7. Satisfaction Approval Voting and Minimax Ap-
proval Voting do not satisfy simple justified representation for
k ≥ 2, d ≥ 1.
Proof. When d = 1, attribute-approvals can be visualized
as candidate-approvals. It is proved for candidate-approvals
that MAV and SAV do not satisfy justified representation for
k ≥ 2 [2]. For d > 1, the same set of voters are repeated for
all the attributes of a candidate then the proof follows.
Definition 2. W provides compound justified representation
if there does not exist a set of voters V ′ ⊆ V such that (|V ′| ≥
n
k ) ∧ ( ∩vi∈V ′
Cji 6= ∅) ∧ (|( ∪
vi∈V ′
Cji ) ∩W
j | = ∅), 1 ≤ j ≤ d.
Lemma 8. There may not exist a committee that provides
compound justified representation for k ≥ 3.
Proof. Consider a set of candidates ci = [ai, bi], i ∈ [1,m]
with m = 6. Voting approvals of attributes are given as
Va1 = Vb4 = {v1, v2}, Va2 = Vb5 = {v3, v4}, Va3 = Vb6 =
{v5, v6}, {Vb1 = Vb2 = Vb3 = Va4 = Va5 = Va6 = {v1}.
For k = 3, none of the three candidate committees satisfy
compound justified representation. One can assure a com-
mittee that satisfies CJR for k = 2 if we assume that each
attribute is approved by at least one voter.
Proposition 2. If a rule does not satisfies simple justified rep-
resentation then it does not satisfies compound justified rep-
resentation also.
It can be seen from Lemmas (5-7) and Proposition 2 that
AV, SAV, RAV, PAV and MAV do not satisfy SJR as well as
CJR. We adopt Greedy Approval Voting and extend it to at-
tribute level in the next section that satisfies SJR. We show
that the proposed GAV satisfies CJR based on some assump-
tions.
5 Attribute Level Greedy Approval Voting
Greedy Approval Voting (GAV) is a multi-step approach. It
starts by setting V ′ = V and W = ∅. At every step it selects
a candidate c∗ having an attribute with the highest number of
approvals with respect to V ′ and add it toW . It then removes
all voters who voted for at least one attribute of c∗ from V
′.
This process is repeated till |W | = k. In case if the voter list
V ′ is empty when |W | < k, we set V ′ to V . Once the voter
list is empty, random selection of candidates would satisfy
the weak unanimity and SJR properties but fails many other
properties. GAV is similar to the greedy approach proposed
in [2] when d = 1 and the selection is arbitrary. The main
flow of GAV can be found in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Greedy Approval Voting
W ← ∅; V ′ ← V ;
Let V ′c[j] be the set of voters approved for c[j] from V
′;
while |W | < k do
c∗ ← ARGMAX
ci∈C
MAX(|V ′ci[j]|)
d
j=1;
W ←W ∪ {c∗}; C ← C \ {c∗};
V ′ ← V ′ \ {∪j Vc∗[j]}; if |V
′| = 0 then V ′ ← V ;
end
Lemma 9. Greedy Approval Voting satisfies weak unanimity.
Proof. If there exists an attribute which is approved by all
voters, GAV selects the corresponding candidate first. Hence,
GAV satisfies weak unanimity.
Lemma 10. Greedy Approval Voting satisfies strong unanim-
ity if ties are broken in favor of the candidates that provide
strong unanimity.
Proof. We say that a voter is unrepresented on dimension j
if none of his/her approved attributes from the domain Dj
are present inW . We define the following tie-breaking rules,
1) If there exists multiple attributes with the same number
of approvals, we select the one which is having the highest
number of approvals according to the unrepresentative voters
of the dimension where the attribute is present. 2) If multiple
candidates have a unanimous attribute, we select the one with
more number of unanimous attributes. Using the above two
tie-breaking rules GAV selects a committee which is having
at least one unanimous attribute on every dimension (if there
exists such attribute on that dimension). Hence, GAV satisfies
strong unanimity.
Lemma 11. Greedy Approval Voting satisfies simple justified
representation.
Proof. A rule does not satisfy simple justified representation
if it completely ignores a set of nk voters who jointly approved
for some attribute. If we prove that GAV does not leave any nk
voters who jointly approved for an attribute then we are done.
GAV is a multi-stage approach and at every step it selects a
candidate having an attribute with maximum number of ap-
provals with respect to unrepresented voters. Even if there
exist completely disjoint sets of voters, each of size nk , GAV
can cover all such voters in k steps. Hence, GAV satisfies
simple justified representation.
We could not find any polynomial time rule that satisfies
compound justified representation. Given W it is easy to see
whether it satisfies CJR or not. However, checking every pos-
sible W results in exponential behaviour. We consider each
dimension separately and identify a set of attributes that sat-
isfy justified representation for that dimension. This can be
done in polynomial time using the proposed GAV. Let J i be
the set of attributes that satisfies justified representation for
dimension i. Selection of a committee that satisfies CJR is
polynomial if we assume that J1×J2× . . .×Jd ⊆ C. In ad-
dition to unanimity and justified representation, GAV satisfies
other properties that are described in Section 2.1.
6 Conclusions and Discussion
The present work initiates a new direction of research namely,
use of attribute approvals for a committee selection prob-
lem. We extended the existing rules for committee selec-
tion by candidate-approval voting to attribute-approval vot-
ing. We also analyzed the standard properties that are desired
to be satisfied by these rules. When the rules are extended to
attribute-space, most of these properties were violated. We
proposed Greedy Approval Voting and gave a detailed analy-
sis wherein properties like unanimity and justified represen-
tation are shown to be satisfied.
Preference by ranking is another way of expressing voters
preferences apart from preference by approval ballots. De-
termining a committee of size k, given voters ranking over
attributes is an interesting direction for future work. In recent
years, ranking by pairwise preferences has gained attention
due to its user friendliness and easiness. Forming a commit-
tee given pairwise preferences of voters over attributes is an-
other interesting direction to pursue future research. Further,
exploring the Pareto-optimal set of candidates and studying
different properties of those sets is a good direction to pur-
sue. We plan to investigate these aspects in the future.
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